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I. PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
The following is a list of parties to the proceeding: 
1. Rolando Avila, plaintiff; 
2. Holy Cross Hospital Park City Ambulance, 
defendant; 
3. Holy Cross Hospital Family Health and Emergency 
Center, de fendant; 
4. Holy Cross Hospital, defendant; 
5. Robert Winn, M.D., defendant; and 
6. David J. Howe, M.D., defendant. 
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IV. JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from a final Order by Judge Michael R. 
Murphy of the Third Judicial District Court, Summit County, State 
of Utah entered on November 10, 1988 dismissing plaintifffs 
Complaint for failure to comply with the appropriate Statute of 
Limitations period §78-14-4 U.C.A. and §78-14-12(1) of the Utah 
Health Care Medical Malpractice Act. This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to §78-2-2(j) Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended 1988 
supplement), as prescribed by Rule 3 of the Utah Supreme Court 
Rules. 
V. STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The issues presented on appeal are: 
1. Whether §78-14-12 precludes the prior filing of a 
Complaint to comply with §78-14-4, a private right cause of 
action, where the state fails to hold a prelitigation review 
hearing at no fault of the plaintiff; 
2. Whether the defendants waived the defense of the 
Statute of Limitations or are estopped from asserting the 
defense, where an answer was filed not containing the defense and 
where defendants stipulated that the time for the prelitigation 
hearing as required by §78-14-12(3) be extended; 
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3. Whether defendants' second Motion to Dismiss is 
barred by the doctrines of res judicata and judicial estoppel; 
4. Whether the "Utah Medical Malpractice Act," §§78-
14-1 et seq., is unconstitutional for vagueness where there is 
conflicting and unclear procedures between §78-14-4 and §78-14-12 
and plaintiff's right to due process is left at the mercy of the 
state. 
VI. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
The determinative Utah Statutes provide as follows: 
Section 78-14-4(1): 
No malpractice action against a health care provider 
may be brought unless it is commenced within two years 
after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through 
the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered 
the injury, whichever first occurs, but not to exceed 
four years after the date of the alleged act, omission, 
neglect or occurrence . . .[Emphasis added. Portions 
omitted]. 
Section 78-14-8: 
No malpractice action against a health care provider 
may be initiated unless and until the plaintiff gives 
the prospective defendant or his executor or successor, 
at least ninety days' prior notice of intent to 
commence an action. Such notice shall include a 
general statement of the nature of the claim, the 
persons involved, the date, time and place of the 
occurrence, the circumstances thereof, specific 
allegations of misconduct on the part of the 
prospective defendant, the nature of the alleged 
injuries and other damages sustained. Notice may be in 
letter or affidavit form executed by the plaintiff or 
his attorney. Service shall be accomplished by persons 
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authorized and in the manner prescribed by the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure for the service of the summons 
and complaint in a civil action or by certified mail, 
return receipt requested, in which case notice shall be 
deemed to have been served on the date of mailing. 
Such notice shall be served within the time allowed 
for commencing a malpractice action against a health 
care provider. If the notice is served less than 
ninety days prior to the expiration of the applicable 
time period, the time for commencing the malpractice 
action against the health care provider shall be 
extended to 120 days from the date of service of 
notice. 
This section shall, for purpose of determining its 
retroactivity, not be construed as relating to the 
limitation on the time for commencing any action, and 
shall apply only to causes of action arising on or 
after April 1, 1976. This section shall not apply to 
third party actions, counterclaims or crossclaims 
against a health care provider. [Emphasis added]. 
Section 78-14-12: 
(1) The Department of Business Regulations shall 
provide a hearing panel in alleged medical malpractice 
cases against health care providers as defined in 
Section 78-14-3 filed after July 1, 1985. The 
department shall establish procedures for prelitigation 
consideration of personal injury and wrongful death 
claims for damages arising out of the provision of or 
alleged failure to provide health care. The 
proceedings are informal and nonbinding, but are 
compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing 
litigation. Proceedings conducted under authority of 
this section are confidential, privileged, and immune 
from civil process. 
(2) The party initiating the medical malpractice action 
shall file a request for prelitigation panel review 
with the Department of Business Regulations within 60 
days after the filing of a statutory notice of intent 
to commence action under Section 78-14-8. The request 
shall include a copy of the notice of intent to 
commence action. The request shall be mailed to all 
health care providers named in the notice and request. 
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(3) The filing of a request for prelitigation panel 
review under this section tolls the applicable statute 
of limitations until 60 days following the issuance of 
an opinion by the prelitigation panel. The opinion 
shall be sent to all parties by certified mail, return 
receipt requested. [Emphasis added]. 
Section 78-14-13: 
(1) No record of the proceedings is required and all 
evidence, documents, and exhibits are returned to the 
parties or witnesses who provided the evidence, 
documents, and exhibits at the end of the proceedings-
The hearing panel has the authority to issue subpoenas 
and to administer oaths, and any expenses incurred by 
the panel in this regard are paid by the requesting 
party, including, but not limited to, witness fees and 
mileage. The proceedings are informal and formal rules 
of evidence are not applicable. There is no discovery 
or perpetuation of testimony in the proceedings, except 
upon special order of the panel, and for good cause 
shown demonstrating extraordinary circumstances. 
(2) A party is entitled to attend, personally or with 
counsel, and participate in the proceedings, except 
upon special order of the panel and unanimous agreement 
of the parties. The proceedings are confidential and 
closed to the public. No party shall have the right to 
cross-examine, rebut, or demand that customary 
formalities of civil trials and court proceedings be 
followed. The panel may, however, request special or 
supplemental participation of some or all parties in 
particular respects. Communications between the panel 
and the parties, except the testimony of the parties on 
the merits of the dispute, are disclosed to all other 
parties. 
(3) The Department of Business Regulation shall 
appoint a panel to consider the claim and set the 
matter for panel review as soon as practicable after 
receipt of a request. 
(4) Parties may be represented by counsel in 
proceedings before a panel. [Emphasis added]. 
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Constitution of Utah, Article 1, Section 7. No person 
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without 
due process of law. 
VII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a final Order of the Third 
District Court in and for Summit County, State of Utah, Judge 
Michael R. Murphy, which granted defendants1 second Motion to 
Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint. Defendants' Motions were based 
upon the assertion that even though plaintiff timely filed a 
Complaint under §78-14-4(1) which was not dismissed by the first 
Motion to Dismiss, but instead tolled, plaintiff failed to comply 
with §78-14-12 of the Utah Medical Malpractice Act by not filing 
a second Complaint because §78-14-12(1) states in part that: "* * 
* Prelitigation review proceedings are informal and nonbinding, 
but are compulsory as a condition precedent to commence 
litigation." 
Defendants' Second Motions to Dismiss were granted 
(even though the Complaint was filed and the statute of 
limitations was then tolled under Court order on defendants' 
First Motions to Dismiss) apparently because the Department of 
Business Regulations had not conducted a hearing, and yet after 
the hearing was finally held, the Court concluded a new complaint 
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should have been filed within 60 days thereafter, and since a 
new complaint was not so filed, plaintiff's old complaint was 
dismissed. The Court found that the complaint was filed before 
the hearing was held and that the "Statute of Limitations had 
run" after the hearing was finally held, barring the plaintiff 
from filing a new complaint.1 (See Minute Entry attached as 
Exhibit "H" ). 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Plaintiff was involved in a skiing accident, 
dislocating his right lower leg, on February 1, 1984. On or 
about January 31, 1986, plaintiff timely filed a Notice of Intent 
to Commence Malpractice Action and filed a request with the 
Department of Business Regulations for a prelitigation panel 
review on March 4, 1986 within 60 days of the Notice of Intent. 
Due to scheduling problems, the Department of Business 
Regulations could not hold a timely prelitigation review panel. 
On or about May 23, 1986, plaintiff filed a Complaint 
in the Third District Court for Summit County, State of Utah. On 
or about June 19, 1986, defendant David Howe, M.D. filed an 
Answer to plaintiff's Complaint. On June 30, 1986, the parties 
1
 Counsel for appellant apologize to this court should the 
foregoing paragraph appear awkward and confusing. The events 
underlying this paragraph are awkward and confusing. 
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entered into a Stipulation extending the time for the hearing, A 
partial prelitigation review hearing was finally held on December 
2, 1986. On or about November 4 and 7, 1987, defendants filed a 
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to comply 
with the Utah Medical Malpractice Act, §78-14-12, U.C.A, 1953 as 
amended. 
On March 7, 1988, based partially on stipulation of 
counsel and the pleadings, District Court Judge Pat Brian denied 
defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint, sent the 
case back for a full prelitigation panel review, and tolled the 
proceedings pending a full prelitigation review, in order to meet 
the requirements of the Utah Medical Malpractice Act. On July 6, 
1988, a second prelitigation panel review was held and an opinion 
was issued on July 12, 1988. In the latter part of September, 
1988, defendants again filed Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff's 
Complaint for failure to comply with the Utah Medical Malpractice 
Act. Plaintiff filed a Motion for a Continuance to obtain 
counsel. The hearing was held on October 17, 1988, Plaintiff's 
Motion to Continue was denied and Defendants' Motions to Dismiss 
were granted. 
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C. DISPOSITION OF TRIAL COURT 
The issues involved in this appeal were properly dealt 
with by the Court on defendants' first Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiff's Complaint. District Court Judge Pat Brian denied 
defendants' Motion to Dismiss, requested that a full 
prelitigation panel review hearing be held, and in mind of the 
legislative intent requiring a prelitigation review in medical 
malpractice actions before litigation may commence, the Court 
tolled any litigation proceedings pending a full prelitigation 
review. The Court did not dismiss plaintiff's Complaint, but 
further ordered that subsequent to the decision rendered by the 
panel, the Court would entertain relevant dispositive motions. 
On defendants' second Motion to Dismiss defendants again argued 
that plaintiff failed to comply with the Utah Medical Malpractice 
Act by filing a Complaint before a prelitigation review hearing 
could be held. Defendants further argued that plaintiff's 
Complaint should be dismissed for failure to prosecute because 
the Complaint had been filed in May, 1986 and it was now October, 
1988. Judge Murphy, apparently disregarding the Court's previous 
ruling denying defendants' Motions and tolling the proceedings, 
granted defendants' second Motion to Dismiss for failure to 
comply with the Utah Medical Malpractice Act. The Court also 
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barred any refiling of the Complaint because the Statute of 
Limitations had run. 
D. RELEVANT FACTS 
1. Plaintiff and appellant, Rolando Avila (Avila) fell 
skiing, which caused the dislocation of his right knee. This 
occurred at approximately 3:00 p.m. on February 1, 1984 at Park 
City, Utah. Mr. Avila was a member of the Bolivian National Ski 
Team prior to the accident, and was in Park City, Utah training 
for the 1988 winter Olympic Games and other world-class ski 
events. (See Complaint Exhibit "D", page 3). 
2. Mr. Avila was taken off the mountain and placed in 
the care of Holy Cross Hospital, specifically Holy Cross 
Ambulance Service, and was transferred to Dr. Wynn, a 
pediatrician at the Holy Cross Clinic in Park City, Utah. It is 
alleged that Dr. Wynn was negligent in his attempt to put the 
knee "back into place" and the right popliteal artery was 
severed. Dr. Winn claims he was acting under verbal instructions 
of Dr. Howe at Holy Cross Hospital. This occurred at 
approximately 4:00 p.m. on February 1, 1984. (See Complaint, 
Exhibit "D", p. 4). 
3. Mr. Avila was then transferred to Holy Cross 
Hospital in Salt Lake City, Utah. Upon arrival he was examined 
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by Dr. David Howe and was quickly taken to surgery. Mr. Avila 
underwent a femoral popliteal artery bypass grafting, using the 
autogenous saphenous vein from his left leg. During surgery, a 
sterile environment was not maintained and inadequate wound care 
was given by the staff of Holy Cross Hospital resulting in 
infection, postponement of necessary surgery and additional 
surgery due to the condition of Avilafs leg. (Complaint, Exhibit 
"D", pps. 5-6). 
4. As a result of Mr. Avilafs loss of his popliteal 
artery and subsequent graft, he is placed at a risk of loss of 
his right leg and has been advised by Dr. Howe that he cannot ski 
or participate in active sports again due to the risk. 
5. On January 31, 1986, within two years of the injury 
on February 1, 1984 as required by the Statute of Limitations, 
U.C.A. §78-14-4(1), Mr. Avila timely filed a Notice of Intent to 
Commence Action, which was sent to all parties by certified mail, 
return receipt requested, pursuant to §78-14-8, U.C.A. (1953 as 
amended) (Exhibit "A"), extending the time to file a Complaint 
from February 1, 1986 to May 31, 1986 as provided by §78-14-8, 
U.C.A. (1953 as amended). 
6. On March 4, 1986, Avila requested a hearing before 
a prelitigation review panel. This was requested within 60 days 
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of the filing of the Notice of Intent to Commence Action pursuant 
to §78-14-12, U.C.A. (1953 as amended). (Exhibit "A"). 
7. Even though the Department of Business Regulations 
had not scheduled the hearing, in order to comply with the 120 
day extension period of the Statute of Limitations provided in 
§17-14-8, U.C.A. (1953 as amended), Avila filed his Complaint on 
May 23, 1986. (Exhibit "D"). 
8. On or about June 19, 1986, defendant David Howe, 
M.D. filed an Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint. The Answer did 
not contain any affirmative defenses relating to the Statute of 
Limitations or the failure of any condition precedent to 
plaintiff's Complaint. (Exhibit "E" ). 
9. Due to further scheduling problems, the Department 
of Business Regulations still had not held a timely prelitigation 
review hearing. Dr. Howe filed an Answer to plaintiff's 
Complaint on June 20, 1986, which did not contain any affirmative 
defense relating to the Statute of Limitations. (Exhibit "E"). 
All defendants entered an appearance by written Stipulation dated 
June 30, 1986. The Stipulation extended the time for hearing by 
the prelitigation review panel as required by §78-14-13(3), 
U.C.A. (1953 as amended) for successive 30 day periods until such 
time as the Department of Business Regulations could schedule the 
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hearing. (Exhibit "C"). No objection to the Statute of 
Limitations was made. 
10. A prelitigation review hearing was not held until 
December 2, 1986. (Exhibit "F"). 
11. Notwithstanding defendants' Answers and 
Stipulation, one year later in November, 1987, defendants filed a 
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to comply 
with Utah's Medical Malpractice Act, specifically the two year 
Statute of Limitations provided in §78-14-4 and §78-14-12, U.C.A. 
(1953 as amended). (Exhibits "G" and "H"). 
12. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss came on regularly 
for hearing on March 7, 1988 before Third District Court Judge 
Pat Brian. The Court recognized the fact that plaintiff had 
filed his Complaint before a complete prelitigation review 
hearing was held and that the review conducted on December 2, 
1986 was not a complete review. To carry out the legislative 
intent behind the Utah Medical Malpractice Act, Judge Brian did 
not dismiss plaintiff's Complaint, but rather tolled any 
proceedings relevant to the action pending full prelitigation 
review. The Court went on to state that it would entertain 
relevant dispositive motions subsequent to the decision rendered 
by the review panel. (See Order of Judge Brian attached as 
Exhibit "I"). 
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13. On July 6, 1988, a second prelitigation panel 
review was held and an opinion was rendered on July 12, 1988. 
(Exhibit "J"). 
14. On or about August 24, 1988, plaintiffs counsel, 
George M. Haley, withdrew from the case leaving plaintiff without 
counsel. (Exhibit "L")* 
15. In the latter part of September, defendants again 
filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to 
prosecute and failure to comply with the Utah Medical Malpractice 
Act Statute of Limitations requirement, this time arguing that a 
new Complaint should have been filed within 60 days of July 12, 
1988, even though action on the Complaint as filed had been 
tolled. (Exhibit "K"). 
16. A hearing was held on October 17, 1988 before 
Judge Michael Murphy of the Third District Court. This time the 
Court granted defendants1 Motion to Dismiss because a new 
Complaint had not been filed.. (See Minute Entry attached as 
Exhibit "H"). The Order was entered on November 10, 1988. 
VIII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Avila has complied with the applicable Statute of 
Limitations by filing his Complaint within the 120 days after the 
Notice of Intent to Commence an Action, which was filed within 
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the two year period required, under U.C.A. §78-14-4(1). The 
Court cannot dismiss Avilafs Complaint for failure to comply with 
the Statute of Limitations. 
Avila has done everything in his power to comply with 
the Utah Medical Malpractice Act, U.C.A. §78-14-1 et seq., while 
still remaining within the applicable Statute of Limitations 
period. There is no question that Avila complied with the 
requirement of U.C.A. §78-14-8 and U.C.A. §78-14-12(2). 
Avila?s cause of action arose on February 1, 1984. The 
Complaint was filed on May 23, 1986, within 120 days of the 
timely filing of his Notice of Intent to Commence a Malpractice 
Action in accordance with U.C.A. §78-14-8. The delay in 
scheduling the prelitigation review hearing was not the fault of 
Avila. The defendants answered the Complaint and later entered 
into a Stipulation extending the time period for the 
prelitigation hearing. The District Court realizing this, 
properly dealt with defendants1 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's 
Complaint at the first hearing by not dismissing the timely filed 
Complaint, but by tolling any relevant proceedings pending a full 
and complete prelitigation review. This complete prelitigation 
review was not held until July 12, 1988. Defendants waited for 
the 60 day limitation period following an opinion to expire--
knowing that plaintiff would not file a new Complaint as there 
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had already been a hearing on this before the Court and his first 
Complaint had not been dismissed by the Court—then filed a 
second Motion to Dismiss arguing the same reasons as before, that 
is, that plaintiff's Complaint violated §78-14-4 and §78-14-12. 
At the hearing, defendants also argued plaintiff's failure to 
prosecute the case (transcript, October 11, 1988, pg. 3), 
however, defendants failed to point out to the Court that the 
Court previously tolled all relevant proceedings pending a 
complete prelitigation review hearing, which was not held until 
July 12, 1988. 
Based upon the vagueness of the Utah Medical 
Malpractice Act and the Court's two rulings, it would be 
impossible for the plaintiff to comply with both the Statute of 
Limitations period in §78-14-4 and with the Utah Medical 
Malpractice Act, §78-14-12. The Court's first ruling did not 
dismiss the Complaint, and tolled litigation to conform with §78-
14-12, but the Court's second ruling, made after the limitation 
period had expired so plaintiff could not refile, dismissed 
plaintiff's Complaint to comply with §78-14-12. 
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IX. ARGUMENT 
A. PLAINTIFFTS COMPLAINT WAS FILED WITHIN THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATION PERIOD. 
Plaintiff's claim arose on February 1, 1984. Within 2 
years on January 31, 1986, in accordance with the applicable 
Statute of Limitations, U.C.A. §78-14-4(1), Avila filed a Notice 
of Intent to Commence an Action under U.C.A. §78-14-8. 
Plaintiff's Complaint was filed on May 23, 1986 within the 120 
day extension provision of §78-14-8. Therefore, plaintiff's 
Complaint was filed within the applicable Statute of Limitations 
period. Furthermore, a timely request for prelitigation review 
was filed by the plaintiff, which tolls the Statute of 
Limitations until 60 days following the issuance of an opinion by 
the prelitigation panel. §78-14-12(3). The 120 day extension 
was to expire, however, before the issuance of an opinion, and 
plaintiff, wanting to ensure compliance with the Statute of 
Limitations, filed his Complaint within the 120 day period. The 
District Court cannot dismiss plaintiff's Complaint for failing 
to comply with the Statute of Limitations. 
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B. THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE UTAH HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE 
ACT HAVE BEEN SATISFIED. 
The Utah Medical Malpractice Act (UMMA), Utah Code 
Annotated §78-14-1 et seq, (1986) was followed by the plaintiff 
both to the letter and spirit of the law. U.C.A. §78-14-4 
establishes a statute of limitations on medical malpractice 
actions at two years from the date the cause of action arises or 
is discovered. The plaintiff in this action was injured and thus 
his cause of action arose on February 1, 1984. On January 31, 
1986, within the two year Statute of Limitations, a Notice of 
Intent to Commence Action was filed and mailed to the parties 
pursuant to U.C.A. §78-14-8. (Exhibit "A"). Because the Notice 
of Intent to Commence Action was filed less than ninety days 
prior to the expiration of the two year Statute of Limitations, 
the time was extended to 120 days from the date the Notice was 
served. §78-14-8. 
On March 4, 1986, pursuant to U.C.A. §78-14-12(2), the 
plaintiff filed with the Department of Business Regulations a 
Request For Prelitigation Panel Review. (Exhibit "B"). The 
filing of the Request tolled the applicable Statute of 
Limitations for a period of 60 days following an issuance of an 
opinion by the review panel. §78-14-12(3). 
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It appears, therefore, that the plaintiff would not be 
required to file a Complaint until 60 days after the opinion of 
the review panel• However, the Department of Business 
Regulations was having difficulty convening a prelitigation 
review panel and thus the 120 day limitation period was going to 
expire before the issuance of an opinion. The delay in the 
review hearing was due to no fault of the plaintiff. The 
plaintiff, therefore, felt it prudent to file a Complaint within 
the 120 day period, although prior to the time scheduled for the 
prelitigation review, to avoid any possible defense based upon 
the running of the statute of limitations.2 
Plaintiff filed the Complaint on May 23, 1986. In June 
it became apparent to the parties that the Department of Business 
Regulations could not conduct a timely review hearing after 
receiving plaintiff's Request and the parties entered into a 
Stipulation extending the time for successive 30 day periods 
until a hearing could be held. (Exhibit "C"). A hearing was 
held in December, 1986, and defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiff's Complaint in May, 1986, clearly before the 
prelitigation hearing arguing that plaintiff had commenced 
2
 It is ironic to note that by filing within the 120 
limitation period to avoid the Statute of Limitations, 
plaintiff's Complaint was dismissed and he is now out of court 
due to his alleged failure to comply with the Statute of 
Limitations. (See Minute Entry of Judge Murphy, Exhibit "H"). 
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litigation before the hearing in violation of §78-14-12 which 
provides that such proceedings "are informal and unbinding, but 
are compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing 
litigation." The Trial Court denied defendants' Motion, 
realizing the delay was on behalf of the Department of Business 
Regulations and in order to comply with §78-14-12(1) the Court 
tolled any litigation pending a complete prelitigation hearing 
yet to be held. But it is important to note that the Court did 
not dismiss plaintiff's Complaint. The Court Order has been 
complied with by the plaintiff, there has been no litigation 
prior to July 12, 1988, when a complete hearing was finally held 
within two months defendants filed the same Motions to Dismiss. 
The purpose of the UMMA has been satisfied in this case. 
C. THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT LOSE HIS RIGHT TO BRING THE 
INSTANT MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION DUE TO 
ADMINISTRATIVE DELAYS OF THE STATE. 
As clearly set forth in the facts above, the delay in 
the commencement of this action was not the fault of the 
plaintiff. The intent of UMMA was frustrated due to the failure 
of the Department of Business Regulations to hold a timely 
prelitigation review panel. Because of the delay, plaintiff 
could not have complied with both §78-14-12 of the Act and the 
Statute of Limitations §78-14-4. 
19 
Plaintiff either had to allow the 120 day limitation 
period to expire and be barred by the Statute of Limitations or 
plaintiff had to file a Complaint prior to the prelitigation 
review hearing. Plaintiff chose to file the Complaint• This 
decision was based upon an intention to be overly cautious and 
provide ample notice and opportunity for the defendants to 
respond as opposed to running the risk of losing a cause of 
action based upon the running of the Statute of Limitations. 
The situation the plaintiff found himself in was not 
one anticipated by the Utah State Legislature. The State's 
administrative delays resulted in the expiration of the Statute 
of Limitations before a prelitigation review panel could be held. 
Due to the delay by the Department of Business Regulations the 
Court should not have dismissed plaintiff's Complaint. Failure 
to meet a statutory condition precedent does not require a 
dismissal, Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 150 (Utah 1979), 
citing Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265 (1961). The cases 
cited by defendants in support of their Motions to Dismiss are 
not on point in this case. Each one deals with plaintiffs having 
failed to provide notice or a timely request. In each case the 
plaintiff was at fault. In the instant action, plaintiff did all 
that was feasibly possible to comply with the statutory 
requirements. It is manifestly unjust for the Court to dismiss 
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plaintiff's Complaint due to the delay on the part of the 
Department of Business Regulations. 
D. BY ANSWERING PLAINTIFFfS COMPLAINT AND BY ENTERING AN 
APPEARANCE THROUGH STIPULATING THAT THE TIME FOR THE 
PRELITIGATION HEARING MAY BE EXTENDED, THE DEFENDANTS 
WAIVED THE DEFENSE OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS OR ARE 
ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING SUCH DEFENSE. 
The defendants waived their claims by their course of 
dealing. Dr. Howe answered the Complaint on June 19, 1986 with 
no affirmative defense relating to the Statute of Limitations or 
the failure of a condition precedent to filing the Complaint. 
The Statute of Limitations defense must be plead as an 
affirmative defense in a responsive pleading or it is waived. 
Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Insurance Company,, 664 P.2d 1188 
(Utah 1983). 
On June 30, 1986, all of the parties subsequent to the 
filing of the Complaint, entered into a Stipulation which 
provided that the time for the state to hold the hearing as 
required under §78-14-13(3) be extended indefinitely for 
successive 30 day periods. The Statute of Limitations are not 
jurisdictional and can be waived. American Coal Company v. 
Sandstorm, 689 P.2d 1 (Utah 1984). The parties may also waive 
statutory remedies or procedural defects. Lindon City v. 
Engineers Construction Company, 636 P.2d 1070 (Utah 1981); Moss 
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Theaters, Inc. v. Turner, 616 P.2d 1127 (N.M. App. 1980); Bigill 
v. Luster, 672 P.2d 570 (Idaho App. 1983) cert, denied, appeal 
dismissed 467 U.S. 1247, 104 S.Ct. 3527, 82 L.Ed.2d 834. To 
constitute a "waiver", one's actions must be distinctively made 
and must show in some unequivocal manner an intent to waive. 
Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430 (Utah 1983). Defendant Howe 
answered the Complaint, waiving the affirmative defense of the 
Statute of Limitations and all parties signed a Stipulation filed 
with the Court after the filing of plaintiff's Complaint 
intentionally tolling the Statute of Limitations and extending 
the period in which the State could hold a hearing pursuant to 
§78-14-13(3). Such acts constitute a waiver of these claims by 
the defendants. 
The elements of equitable estoppel are, conduct by one 
party which leads another in reliance thereon to adopt a course 
of action resulting in detriment or damage if the first party is 
permitted to repudiate his conduct. Blackhurst v. Transamerica 
Insurance Company, 699 P.2d 688 (Utah 1985); United American Life 
Insurance Company v. Zions First National Bank, 641 P.2d 158 
(Utah 1982); Leaver v. Grose, 610 P.2d 1262 (Utah 1980). The 
course of dealing with defendants raises an estoppel against the 
claims of the defendants. Dixon v. Stoddard, 627 P.2d 83 (Utah 
1981). The plaintiff in good faith relied upon the acts of the 
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defendants. The purpose of estoppel is to prevent injury arising 
from the actions of the defendants which are relied upon in good 
faith. Roth v. First Security Bank of Rock Springs, Wyoming, 684 
P.2d 93 (Wyo. 1984); Larson v. Wycoff Company, 624 P.2d 1151 
(Utah 1981); Coleman v. Coleman, 743 P.2d 782 (Utah App. 1987). 
The plaintiff relied upon the acts of the defendant, the Answer 
and Stipulation of the parties and it would be detrimental to the 
plaintiff to allow the defendants to repudiate their conduct. 
See Arrowhead Construction Company of Dodge City, Kansas, Inc. v. 
Essex Corporation, 662 P.2d 1195 (Kan. 1983) where the insurers 
were estopped from changing their admission where individuals 
relied upon the Stipulation and in the process gave up their 
statutory remedy of lien foreclosure. 
E. IF THE FILING OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT BEFORE A REVIEW 
HEARING IS CONSIDERED A VIOLATION OF §78-14-12(1) THE 
MALPRACTICE ACT, SUCH ACT IS VAGUE AND 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
Section 78-14-4 of the Utah Medical Malpractice Act 
provides that "no malpractice action against a health care 
provider may be brought unless it is commenced within two years 
after the plaintiff or patient discovers . . . " The Act also 
requires a prelitigation review panel be held before an action 
can be commenced. 
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Utah Code Annotated, §78-14-12(1) provides: "The 
proceedings are informal and unbinding, but are compulsory as a 
condition precedent to commencing litigation." 
Constitutional provisions provide that every man shall 
have a remedy by due course of law for injury done to him in his 
person, property or reputation. Joseph v. Burns, 491 P.2d 203 
(Or. 1971); Vealey v. Clegg, 579 P.2d 919 (Utah 1978). A statute 
must allow a sufficient period of time to enable plaintiff to 
maintain his cause of action. Greenhalgh v. Payson City, 530 
P.2d 799 (Utah 1975). If §78-14-12(1) is interpreted to mean 
that a person is unable to file suit until after the necessary 
proceedings by the Department of Business Regulations have been 
complied with, the state could then continually delay as in this 
case and the Statute of Limitations under §78-14-4 would work as 
a bar to the remedy before its accrual, making the statute 
unconstitutional. City of Norman v. Liddell, 596 P.2d 879 (Okl. 
1979). If plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed plaintiff will have 
been denied an opportunity to seek relief for his injuries by 
being barred by the Statute of Limitations before the accrual of 
his claim on July 12, 1988. 
The statute states that the proceedings are a condition 
precedent and that the Department of Business Regulations shall 
provide a hearing panel. §78-14-12 U.C.A. (1953 as amended). 
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The proceedings under §78-14-12 were held to the extent possible 
by the plaintiff as a condition precedent to commencing 
litigation. The timely filing of a Notice to Commence an Action 
and Request for a panel review was a proceeding sufficient for 
the plaintiff to meet the requirements of §78-14-12. 
The statute states that the state "shall" provide a 
hearing. A hearing therefore must be provided. There is no 
statement of what happens if the state fails to provide such a 
hearing. To simply refuse the plaintiff a private cause of 
action due to the state's failure to follow the statute is 
manifestly unjust and unconstitutional, in effect depriving the 
plaintiff of rights, privileges, and immunities by the 
constitution under color of state law. 
F. THE COURT'S PRIOR RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS ON MARCH 7, 1988, RAISES A BAR OF RES JUDICATA 
OR COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL TO THE ARGUMENTS IN DEFENDANTS' 
SECOND MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT. 
On or about May 23, 1986, plaintiff filed a Complaint 
in the instant action. On December 2, 1986, due to the delays of 
the State, a prelitigation review hearing was held. On or about 
November 4 and 7, 1987, defendants filed Motions to Dismiss 
Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to comply with the UMMA, §78-
14-12. (Exhibit "G" ). 
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On March 7, 1988, District Court Judge Pat Brian denied 
defendants' Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint and sent the 
case back for a full prelitigation panel review and tolled the 
proceedings pending a full prelitigation review to fulfill the 
requirements of §78-14-12(1)• (Exhibit "I", Order of Judge 
Brian). Plaintiff's Complaint was not dismissed by the Court, 
but rather the Court tolled any further proceedings,3 
On July 6, 1988, a second prelitigation panel review 
was held and an opinion was issued on July 12, 1988. (Exhibit 
"J"). The defendants waited 60 days, then filed a second Motion 
to Dismiss plaintiff's Complaint for failure to comply with UMMA, 
§78-14-12. (Exhibit "K"). 4 The second time, District Court Judge 
Michael R. Murphy granted defendants' Motion to Dismiss and 
dismissed plaintiff's Complaint. The plaintiff relied on the 
Court's prior decision in not dismissing his Complaint, but 
tolling the proceedings. The Court's second decision on the same 
3
 At this time, it must have been evident to the Court that 
plaintiff filed before the necessary review panel could be held 
as the Court requested a more complete hearing be held. The 
Court at this time could have also dismissed plaintiff's 
Complaint for failing to meet the statutory requirements of the 
UMMA and perhaps should have; however, realizing plaintiff's 
predicament the Court did not dismiss plaintiff's Complaint but 
rather tolled the commencement of any litigation specifically 
with §78-14-12 in mind. 
4
 Defendants purposely waited 60 days so the limitation 
period would expire knowing that plaintiff would not file a new 
Complaint based upon the prior court hearing. 
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issues has put the plaintiff at a great disadvantage and is 
unjust. If Judge Brian would have dismissed plaintiff's 
Complaint at the prior hearing, a new Complaint would have been 
filed. Now after relying on Judge Brian's Order, Judge Murphy 
has ruled that the Complaint should have been dismissed, but not 
until more than two years later, after the expiration of the 
Statute of Limitations. To prevent such catastrophic results, 
the law has adopted two principles, res judicata and collateral 
estoppel, and the policy of "law of the case", which provide 
respect and finality to a Court's decision. 
The doctrine of res judicata renders the final judgment 
on the merits conclusive upon the parties and is a bar to 
subsequent litigation of the same issues. Bernard v. Attebury, 
629 P.2d 892 (Utah 1981). Collateral estoppel, or issue 
preclusion, prevents re-litigation of issues that have been once 
litigation and determined in another action even though the 
claims for relief may be different. Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme, 
669 P.2d 873 (Utah 1983). The law of the case is similar to res 
judicata but more limited in that the law of the case applies to 
final decisions affecting the same parties to the same case, 
while res j_udicata forecloses parties or their privies. Verzuh 
v. Rouse, 660 P.2d 1301 (Colo. App. 1982). 
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Under res judicata, the claims of the defendants that 
the Complaint should be dismissed for the second time for 
violating §78-14-12 are barred. The defendants were all parties 
in the prior litigation on the same issues. Judge Brian made a 
final judgment on the merits of the case. The fact that the 
judgment may not be free from error does not preclude the res 
judicata effect. Copper State Thrift and Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 
387 (Utah App. 1987). On a second claim, it is essentially the 
same as a prior claim which has gone to final judgment; res 
judicata means that neither party can again litigate that claim. 
Bradshaw v. Kershaw, 627 P.2d 528 (Utah 1981); Trimble Real 
Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc., 758 P.2d 451 (Utah App. 1988). 
Furthermore, since the issues raised on defendants' 
second Motion are the same issues already dealt with by the 
Court, collateral estoppel precludes the re-litigation of those 
issues. Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., supra. 
Moreover, since the same parties are involved, the law 
of the case is also applicable. Verzuh v. Rouse, supra. The 
moral of the law of the case is based upon the principle that 
when an issue is once litigated and decided that it should be the 
end of the matter. Id. The Court should not be allowed to 
change a ruling whether it believes it to be erroneous or not, if 
either side is prejudiced thereby. State Ex Rel. Harmon v. 
28 
Blanding, 644 P.2d 1082 (Or, 1982). The plaintiff relied upon 
the Court's prior ruling of not dismissing the Complaint but 
simply tolling the litigation. If the Court would have 
previously dismissed the Complaint or if defendants would have 
brought their Motion timely, plaintiff would have filed a new 
Complaint after the second prelitigation hearing but within the 
60 day limitation period. It is improper for a judge presiding 
at trial to grant a Motion which has been denied during prior 
proceedings by a different judge. State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 
738 (Utah 1985). See also Eliopulos v. Colorado State Personnel 
Board, 705 P.2d 1035 (Colo. App. 1985) where the Court of 
Appeals' denial of preliminary Motion to Dismiss Appeal was law 
of the case precluding further consideration of the issue on the 
merits of the appeal. The plaintiff reasonably relied upon the 
Court's previous order and defendants' Motion before Judge Murphy 
are barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral 
estoppel and the policy of law of the case. 
G. PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT CANNOT BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE 
TO PROSECUTE IN OCTOBER, 1988, WHEN THERE IS A COURT 
ORDER TOLLING ANY PROCEEDINGS IN THE MATTER PENDING A 
COMPLETE PRELITIGATION REVIEW, WHICH WAS NOT HELD UNTIL 
JULY 12, 1988. 
Defendants' subsequent Motions to Dismiss were not only 
based upon plaintiff's violation of §78-14-4 and §78-14-12 of the 
UMMA, but upon Rule 41(b) U.R.C.P. and claim that plaintiff's 
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Complaint should be dismissed for failure to prosecute. 
(Exhibits "K" and "M,f). Counsel for defendant, Mr. Epperson, 
argues that the Notice of Intent was filed in January, 1986 and 
it was now October, 1988. (Transcript, October 3, 1988, p. 4, 
Exhibit "N"). Mr. Epperson fails to point out to the Court its 
previous Order tolling any litigation pending a complete review 
hearing. A complete review hearing was not held until July 12, 
1988. (Transcript pg. 8). Plaintiff's own attorney withdrew on 
August 24, 1988 (Exhibit "L"), then defendants filed their Motion 
to Dismiss for failure to prosecute approximately two weeks after 
this date, (Exhibit "K"). In defendant's supportive Memorandum, 
they argue that plaintiff failed to provide any evidence at the 
prelitigation hearing (Exhibit "M"); however, the hearing does 
not go to the merits of the case. §78-14-12. 
The Court dismissed plaintiff's Complaint based upon 
the findings and interpretation of Mr. Epperson as to what the 
Stipulation meant and that a new lawsuit should have been filed 
in December. (Transcript pps. 14 and 15, Exhibit "0"). Mr. 
Epperson claims defendants would not have stopped plaintiff if he 
would have filed in December. (Transcript p. 15). Furthermore, 
Mr. Epperson is asking the Court to rule upon facts that would 
have happened according to defendant's counsel. Plaintiff had to 
rely on and comply with the Court's prior order, not on what 
30 
defendants would have done. Plaintiff could not have filed in 
December anyway, as there wasn't a complete review hearing until 
July of 1988. Any further action in the case was tolled by Judge 
Brian until July 12, 1988 when a complete hearing could be held. 
(Exhibit "I"). By filing in December, plaintiff would not have 
only violated Judge Brian's Order, but he would have still been 
in violation of §78-14-12 because such filing would have still 
been before there was a complete review hearing. 
X, CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff complied with the Utah Medical Malpractice 
Act and the applicable Statute of Limitations. The requirements 
of the Utah Medical Malpractice Act have been satisfied and 
followed to the fullest extent possible by the plaintiff 
considering the delays by the state administrative agency. 
Plaintiff should not lose his right to bring suit due 
to the delays of the state. If plaintiff cannot file a Complaint 
until after the administrative hearing, his remedy did not arise 
until July 12, 1988, after the Statute of Limitations has 
expired, making the Utah Medical Malpractice Act 
unconstitutional. 
The Court previously dealt with defendant's Motion on 
March 7, 1988, before Judge Brian. Defendants were thus barred 
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by res judicata, collateral estoppel, and the law of the case to 
bring the same Motions a second time. The Court's subsequent 
inconsistent position works a great hardship on the plaintiff and 
is unjust. 
Judge Murphy's ruling should be reversed and plaintiff 
should be allowed to proceed on his Complaint. 
DATED this ^ day of May, 1989. 
BROWN, SMITH & HANNA 
By: T ^ - ^ ^ /V ^x^*<-
Charles C. Brown 
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COMMENCE MALPRACTICE ACTION 
Rolando Avila, by and through his counsel, George M. Haley, 
of Haley St Stolebarger, and David R. Hamilton and Michael 
G. Belnap, of Farr, Kaufman St Hamilton, hereby serve notice to 
Robert T. Wynn, M.D., Holy Cross Family Health and Emergency 
Center (hereinafter "Holy Cross Clinic"), Holy Cross Hospital 
Park City Ambulance (hereinafter "Holy Cross Ambulance"), Holy 
Cross Hospital and David Howe, M.D., of Mr. Avila's intention to 
- 1 -
commence a medical malpractice action. 
I. NATURE OF CLAIM 
Mr. Avila1s claim of malpractice arises out of the medical 
treatment: Mr. Avila received after he dislocated his right lower 
extremity in a skiing accident. Mr. Avila fell while skiing and 
hit a lift terminal, which caused the dislocation of his right 
knee. This occurred at approximately 3:00 p.m. on February 1, 
1984, where the Rattler and Wizard ski runs intersect. At the 
location of the injury, he was examined by Dr. Roger Suchyta and 
Dr. Ed Bronski, as well as ski patrolman Janet Stoltz. At the 
time of that examination, Mr. Avila had a palpable dorsalis pedis 
pulse and posterior tibial pulse, and his foot was warm. Based 
upon the examination of the above-referenced individuals, the 
extremity was immobilized by the placing of a splint; and 
Mr. Avila was given 50 milligrams of Meperidine. Based upon the 
findings of the above-referenced individuals, a decision was made 
not to use the helicopter to transport Mr. Avila directly to Holy 
Cross Hospital in Salt Lake City; rather, he was taken by 
toboggan to the bottom of the mountain and placed in the care of 
Holy Cross Hospital by and through their agents, Holy Cross 
Ambulance; the driver, EMT Dyer; and the EMT technician, 
Shoshnik. While the ambulance was still at Deer Valley, the 
splint and ski boot were removed, and a capillary fill test was 
performed. At that point, the capillary fill time of Mr. Avila1s 
right big toe was within acceptable limits. 
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Upon information and belief, Mr. Avila alleges that it 
is the policy of Holy Cross Ambulance to transport all 
individuals picked up at Deer Valley or Park City ski resorts 
directly to the Holy Cross Clinic in Park City. Pursuant to that 
policy and practice of the Holy Cross Ambulance, Mr. Avila was 
transported to the Holy Cross Clinic. When Mr. Avila arrived, he 
was examined by Dr. Wynn, who is a pediatrician who does not have 
the requisite training and experience to handle complicated 
orthopedic problems such as he was faced with in the present 
circumstances. Dr. Wynn did not refer the case to one of the 
available orthopedic surgeons in Park City, nor did Dr. Wynn 
immediately transfer Mr. Avila to a health care facility that had 
the appropriate medical staff to deal with the condition that 
Mr. Avila was in. Dr. Wynn attempted to put the knee "back into 
place" by rotating the lower extremity in a circular motion. 
During this episode, the right popliteal artery was avulsed. 
Dr. Wynn was unsuccessful in his attempt to put the leg back into 
place, and then ordered Mr. Avila transferred to Holy Cross 
Hospital in Salt Lake City. 
The foregoing episode took place on February 1, 1984, at 
approximately 4:00 p.m. 
Mr. Avila arrived at Holy Cross Hospital in the late 
afternoon of February 1, 1984. Upon arrival, his lower extremity 
was examined by Dr. David Howe, who could find no palpable 
dorsalis pedis pulse, or posterior tibial pulses, and Mr. Avila1s 
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foot was cold. Mr. Avila was quickly taken to surgery, where the 
dislocation of the right knee was reduced and the disruption of 
the popliteal artery was disclosed. Mr. Avila underwent a 
femoral popliteal bypass grafting, utilizing the autogenous 
saphenous vein from his left leg. During the surgery, a sterile 
environment was not maintained by the staff of Holy Cross 
Hospital. Further, during the post-operative period, inadequate 
wound care was given to Mr. Avila, resulting in an infection in 
the inferior aspect of the medial incision on the right knee, as 
well as in the left proximal thigh. As a result of the 
infection, the surgery to repair Avilafs anterior cruciate 
ligament, sartorius tendon, medial gastroc, and semimembranosus 
repair had to be postponed. This had an adverse effect on the 
rehabilitation of Mr. Avila. Further, due to the condition of 
the incisions on both legs, Mr. Avila underwent a surgery on 
February 13, 1984, to remove necrosis of peri-incisional skin and 
subcutaneous fat on the left thigh from the donor site. 
As a result of Mr. Avila1s loss of his popliteal artery and 
the subsequent graft, he is placed at a risk of loss of his right 
lower extremity. Prior to the accident, Mr. Avila was a member 
of the Bolivian Nation Ski Team and was in Park City, Utah, 
training for the 1988 Winter Olympic Games and other world-class 
ski races. Mr. Avila has been advised by Dr. Howe that he cannot 
ski again due to the risk of loss of his leg. 
By way of defense, Dr. Wynn claims that he had a 
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consultation over the phone with Dr. Howe wherein Dr. Howe 
directed Dr. Wynn to attempt to get the knee joint back into 
place. 
II. SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT 
A. HOLY CROSS HOSPITAL 
1. Holy Cross Hospital Park City Ambulance Service. 
(a) Mr. Avila alleges that it was misconduct on behalf 
of the EMTfs, ambulance driver or technician to remove 
Mr. Avila1s boot and splint in the ambulance. 
(b) Mr. Avila alleges that under circumstances where 
there is an acute dislocation of the knee, there is a risk of 
pinching the popliteal artery and, as a result, the leg should be 
splinted and immobilized until it can be reset by a qualified 
orthopedic surgeon. 
(c) Mr. Avila further alleges that it is misconduct on 
the part ot Holy Cross Hospital to have a policy of transporting 
patients with acute orthopedic problems to the Holy Cross Clinic 
when there is not appropriate orthopedic staff on duty. 
2. Holy Cross Hospital Family Health Center. 
(a) It was misconduct on behalf of Holy Cross Clinic 
to solicit and treat Mr. Avila, who had an acute orthopedic 
problem, with a member of the staff who was a pediatrician and 
not trained to treat severe orthopedic conditions such as 
Mr. Avila1s. 
(b) It was misconduct on the part of the Clinic 
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to solicit and treat orthopedic patients without having an 
orthopedic surgeon on call to perform that service. 
1. Holy Cross Hospital. 
(a) It was misconduct on the part of Holy Cross 
Hospital to fail to maintain a sterile environment in the 
operating room, which enabled the infection to occur in both 
incision sites. 
(b) It was misconduct on the behalf of the staff of 
Holy Cross Hospital to fail to give to Mr. Avila the appropriate 
post operative wound care, which enabled the infection to take 
place. 
(c) It was misconduct by the staff of Holy Cross 
Hospital to fail to observe, diagnose, report and treat the 
infection in Mr. Avila1s extremities when they were discovered by 
the Hospital staff. 
(d) It was misconduct on behalf of the Hospital to 
maintain a clinic at a ski resort where they use their own 
ambulance service to pick up patients like Mr. Avila, with 
obvious orthopedic problems, and transport them to their own 
clinic to be treated by someone other than an orthopedic surgeon. 
(e) It was misconduct on behalf of Holy Cross Hospital 
not to maintain an orthopedic surgeon at the Park City Clinic if 
they were going to attempt to deal with orthopedic problems. 
(f) It was misconduct on behalf of Holy Cross Hospital 
not to train their staft members, such as Dr. Wynn, to refer 
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orthopedic problems either to an orthopedic surgeon in Park 
City or, alternatively, to transfer immediately orthopedic 
problems such as Mr. Avilafs to a hospital which could perform 
orthopedic services. 
B. ROBERT WYNN, M.D. 
1. It was misconduct on the part of Dr. Wynn to attempt 
treat Mr. Avila, who had an obviously complicated orthopedic 
problem, when Dr. Wynn was a pediatrician and not trained or 
experienced in dealing with injuries such as he was faced with 
with Mr. Avila. 
2. It was misconduct for Dr. Wynn not to refer Mr. Avila 
immediately to an orthopedic surgeon or, alternatively, 
immediately transport Mr. Avila to a health care facility which 
offered orthopedic services. 
3. It was misconduct on behalf of Dr. Wynn to attempt to 
put Mr. Avila's knee back into place at all and, specifically, 
was misconduct to attempt to put the leg back into place by 
rotating the lower portion of that extremity. 
4. It was misconduct on behalf of Dr. Wynn to remove the 
splint placed on the leg. As a result of Dr. Wynn's attempt to 
rotate the lower leg and to put the same into place, the 
popliteal artery was avulsed. 
C. DAVID J. HOWE, M.D. 
Dr. Wynn alleges that he attempted to put the leg in place 
pursuant to the verbal directions given to him by Dr. Howe 
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over the telephone. If this allegation is, in fact, correct, it 
was misconduct on the part of Dr. Howe to: 
1. give verbal directions on the telephone as to how to 
get the leg in place without physically examining the same. 
2. put that treatment in the hands of a pediatrician who 
was not trained and did not have the experience to place an 
acutely dislocated knee back into place. 
3. fail to direct Dr. Wynn to refer Dr. Avila to an 
orthopedic specialist in the Park City area or, alternatively, to 
have Mr. Avila immediately transported to a health care facility 
which offered orthopedic services. 
III. AVILA1S INJURIES AND DAMAGES 
Mr. Avilafs injuries are as follows: 
1. Loss of the popliteal artery, with the increased risk 
of loss of the limb due to the vein graft. 
2. Neurological damage; i.e., numbness, in the right leg 
due to probable nerve damage which occurred during Dr. Wynnfs 
abortive attempt at relocating the knee. 
3. The scarring which occurred on the left leg due to the 
vein grafting. 
4. The scarring and loss of tissue occurring as a result 
of the second surgery to remove the necrotic skin as subcutaneous 
fat and other tissue. 
5. The decrease in function of both extremities due to the 
vein graft and the nerve damage. 
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IV. DAMAGES 
In addition to the foregoing injuries, Mr. Avila was damaged 
due to the actions of the above-referenced health care providers 
in the following particulars: 
1. Mr. Avila was a member of the Bolivian National Ski 
Team and was in training for the 1988 Winter Olympic Games, as 
well as other national and international meets, at the time of 
the accident. As a result of the vein graft, his skiing career 
is over. Had the popliteal artery not been pinched and the knee 
had been put into place appropriately, Mr. Avila would still have 
been able to ski competitively. 
2. Risk of loss of lower extremity due to the vein 
bypass. Mr. Avila has a risk that should he injure his leg 
again, he could lose his leg. 
3. The pain and suffering associated with undergoing the 
two unnecessary surgeries; i.e., the vein graft surgery which 
occurred on February 2, 1984, and the surgery to remove the 
necrotic tissue on February 14, 1984. 
4. Due to the possibility of injuring the artery in his 
leg, and the decreased function of the leg and its accompanying 
effect on Mr. Avilafs lifestyle, Mr. Avila can no longer play 
active sports, such as soccer, tennis, etc. 
5. Pain and suffering associated with the infections and 
recovery from the unnecessary surgery. 
6. The costs of the extended stay in the hospital due to 
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the infection. 
7. Numbness in the legs and feet. 
8. Loss of the opportunity to ski in the 1988 Winter 
Olympic Games. Mr. Avila was assured a spot on the Bolivian 
National Team for the 1988 Olympics. By simply being a member of 
the Olympic Team, he would become a national hero. Mr. Avila had 
the talent and potential to become a world-class skier in the top 
levels of that competition. Due to his injuries, he was deprived 
of that opportunity, with the accompanying loss of the 
opportunity for lucrative endorsements, etc. 
You are hereby directed to notify your attorney and/or 
insurance carrier of this Notice of Intent to Commence 
Malpractice Action in order to notify the Department of Business 
Regulations to schedule a prelitigation medical malpractice 
hearing panel. 
DATED this 31st day of January, 1986. 
HALEY Sc STOLEBARGER 
GEORGE (jk HALEY^' 
Attorned for Rolando A\/ila 
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HALEY & STOLEBARGER 
EXHIBIT "B" 
GEORQE M HALEY 
ROQERT L. STOLEBARGER 
JEFFREY W. APPEL 
A T T O R N E Y S AT LAW 
TENTH F L O O R W A L K E R C E N T E R 
173 S O U T H M A I N S T R E E T 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 8*111-1030 
TELEPHONE (SOI) 3 3 M 3 3 3 
OF COUNSEL 
FRANK E MOSS 
REQUEST FOR PRELITIGATION PANEL REVIEW 
March 4, 1986 
Gwen Rowley 
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS 
REGULATIONS - DOPL 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 45802 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
RE: Robert T. Winn, M.D.; Holy Cross Family 
Health and Emergency Center; Holy Cross 
Hospital Park City Ambulance; Holy Cross 
Hospital; David Howe, M.D. 
Dear Ms. Rowley: 
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated ^ 7 8 - 1 4 - 1 2 , p l e a s e be advised 
t h a t t h i s l e t t e r c o n s t i t u t e s a formal r e q u e s t on b e h a l f of my 
c l i e n t , Rolando A v i l a , for a p r e l i t i g a t i o n pane l rev iew of 
h i s intended medical m a l p r a c t i c e a c t i o n a g a i n s t Robert T. Winn, 
M.D., Holy Cross Family Heal th and Emergency Center , Holy Cross 
H o s p i t a l Park City Ambulance, Holy Cross H o s p i t a l , and David 
Howe, M.D. Per your r e q u e s t , I e n c l o s e h e r e w i t h f i v e cop ie s of 
t h i s l e t t e r , together with s i x c o p i e s o t our N o t i c e o f I n t e n t to 
Sue , and photocopies of our p r o o f s o f s e r v i c e t h e r e o f . 
I look forward to hear ing from y o u a t your e a r l i e s t 
convenience; and in the meantime, s h o u l d you r e q u i r e anything 
f u r t h e r in t h i s regard, p l e a s e g i v e me a c a l l . 
Very t r u l y y o u r s , 
HALEY & STOLEBARGER 
: smw 
Enclosures 
cc All defendants 
n 
GEORGE M. HALEY 
HALEY Sc ST0LE3ARGER 
Tenth Floor, Walker Center 
175 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 531-1555 
DAVID R. HAMILTON 
MICHAEL G. BELNAP 
FARR, KAUFMAN & HAMILTON 
205 - 26th Street, //34 
Ogder., Utah 8^ .401 
(801) 394-5526 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROLANDO AVILA, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . 
ROBERT T. WINN, M.D. ; 
HOLY CROSS FAMILY HEALTH 
AND EMERGENCY CENTER; HOLY 
CROSS HOSPITAL PARK CITY 
AMBULANCE; HOLY CROSS 
HOSPITAL; DAVID HOWE, M.D. , 
Defendants. 
S T I P U L A T I O N 
Civil No. 8885 
Plaintiff, by and through his counsel, George M. Haley, of 
Haley & Stolebarger; defendants Holy Cross Hospital and related 
entities, by and through their counsel, David W. Slagle, of Snow, 
Christensen & Martineau; defendant David Howe, by and through his 
counsel, William W. Barrett, of Kipp and Christian, P.C.; and 
defendant Robert T. Winn, by and through his counsel, hereby 
agree and stipulate that the time for hearing on the prelici-
gation review of the above-referenced case, as required by 
578-14-13(3), may be extended for successive thirty-day periods 
until such time as the Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing can schedule the hearing. 
DATED this gC^day
 0f C5VK]£ 1986. 
HALEY & ST0LE3ARGER 
/ 
^ j 
GEORGE W. HALEY / 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorney for DefendantsyHoly Cross 
Hospital and relatedentities 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Attorney for Defendant Howe 
DAVID H. EPPERSOf 
Attorney for Defendant Winn 
GEORGE M. HALEY 
HALEY & STOLEBARGER 
Tenth Floor, Walker Center 
175 South Main Screec 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 531-1555 
DAVID R. HAMILTON 
MICHAEL G. BELNAP 
FARR, KAUFMAN Sc HAMILTON 
205 - 26th Street, #34 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
(801) 394-5526 
Attorneys for Rolando Avila 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROLANDO AVILA, 
vs. 
ROBERT T. WINN, M.D.; 
HOLY CROSS FAMILY HEALTH 
AND EMERGENCY CENTER; HOLY 
CROSS HOSPITAL PARK CITY 
AMBULANCE; HOLY CROSS 
HOSPITAL; DAVID HOWE, M.D. 
Rolando Avila, by and through his counsel, George M. Haley, 
of Haley & Stolebarger, and David R. Hamilton and Michael 
G. Belnap, of Farr, Kaufman & Hamilton, complains and alleges 
against the defendants as follows: 
1. Rolando Avila is a resident of Summit County, State of 
Utah. 
- 1 -
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2. Robert T. Winn, M.D., is a physician practicing 
medicine in Summit County, State of Utah. 
3- Holy Cross Family Health and Emergency Center (herein-
after ,!Holy Cross Clinic") is a wholly owned subsidiary of Holy 
Cross Hospital and a medical facility doing business in Summit 
County, State of Utah. 
4. Holy Cross Hospital Park City Ambulance (hereinafter 
"Holy Cross Ambulance") is a wholly owned subsidiary of Holy 
Cross Hospital doing business in Summit County, State of Utah. 
5. Holy Cross Hospital is a medical facility doing 
business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
6. David Howe, M.D., is a physician practicing medicine in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
7. Plaintiffrs cause of action against defendants Winn, 
Holy Cross Ambulance and Holy Cross Clinic arose in Summit 
County, State of Utah, 
8. Plaintiff's cause of action against Dr. Howe and Holy 
Cross Hospital arose in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
9. Venue is proper in Summit County, State of Utah. 
10. The plaintiff has fully complied with the requirements 
of U.C.A. $78-14-1, et seo., having filed a timely Notice of 
Intent to Commence Malpractice Action upon the defendants and 
having filed a request with the Department of Business 
Regulations for a prelitigation screening panel. 
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GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
11. Mr. Avilafs claim of malpractice arises out of the 
medical treatment Mr. Avila received after he dislocated his 
right lower leg in a skiing accident. 
12. On February 1, 1984, at approximately 3:00 p.m., the 
plaintiff fell while skiing and hit a lift terminal where the 
Rattler and Wizard ski runs intersect. 
13. The plaintiff dislocated his right knee as a result of 
the fall. 
14. At the location of the injury, he was examined by 
Dr. Roger Suchyta and Dr. Ed Bronski, as well as ski patrolman 
Janet Stoltz. At the time of that examination, Mr. Avila had a 
palpable dorsalis pedis pulse and posterior tibial pulse, and his 
foot was warm. 
15. Based upon the examination of the above-referenced 
individuals, the extremity was immobilized by the placing of a 
splint; and Mr. Avila was given 50 milligrams of Meperidine. 
16. Based upon the findings of the above-referenced 
individuals, a decision was made not to use the helicopter to 
transport Mr. Avila directly to Holy Cross Hospital in Salt Lake 
City; rather, he was taken by toboggan to the bottom of the 
mountain and placed in the care of Holy Cross Hospital by and 
through their agents, Holy Cross Ambulance; the driver, EMT Dyer; 
and the EMT technician, Shoshnik. 
17. While the ambulance was still at Deer Valley, the 
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splint and ski boot were removed by the EMT's, and a capillary 
fill test was performed. At that point, the capillary fill time 
of Mr. Avilafs right big toe was within acceptable limits. 
18. Upon information and belief, Mr. Avila alleges that it 
is the policy of Holy Cross Ambulance to transport all 
individuals picked up at Deer Valley or Park City ski resorts 
directly to the Holy Cross Clinic in Park City. 
19. Pursuant to that policy and practice of the Holy Cross 
Ambulance, Mr. Avila was transported to the Holy Cross Clinic. 
20. When Mr. Avila arrived, he was examined by Dr. Winn, 
who is a pediatrician who does not have the requisite training 
and experience to handle complicated orthopedic problems such as 
he was faced with in the present circumstances. 
21. Dr. Winn did not refer the case to one of the available 
orthopedic surgeons in Park City, nor did Dr. Winn immediately 
transfer Mr. Avila to a health care facility that had the 
appropriate medical staff to deal with the condition that 
Mr. Avila was in. 
22. Dr. Winn attempted to put the knee "back into placeM by 
rotating the lower extremity in a circular motion. During this 
episode, the right popliteal artery was pinched and/or severed. 
23. Dr. Winn was unsuccessful in his attempt to put the leg 
back into place, and then ordered Mr. Avila transferred to Holy 
Cross Hospital in Salt Lake City. 
24. The foregoing episode took place on February 1, 1984, 
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at approximately 4:00 p.m. 
25. Mr. Avila arrived at Holy Cross Hospital in the late 
afternoon of February 1, 1984. Upon arrival, his lower extremity 
was examined by Dr. David Howe, who could find no palpable 
dorsalis pedis pulse, or posterior tibial pulses, and Mr. Avila's 
foot was cold. 
26. Mr. Avila was quickly taken to surgery, where the 
dislocation of the right knee was reduced and the disruption of 
the popliteal artery was disclosed. 
27. Mr. Avila underwent a femoral popliteal bypass 
grafting, utilizing the autogenous saphenous vein from his left 
leg. During the surgery, a sterile environment was not 
maintained by the staff of Holy Cross Hospital. 
28. During the post-operative period, inadequate and 
negligent wound care was given to Mr. Avila by the staff of Holy 
Cross Hospital, resulting in an infection in the inferior aspect 
of the medial incision on the right knee, as well as in the left 
proximal thigh. 
29. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of 
Holy Cross in causing the infection, the surgery to repair 
Avilafs anterior cruciate ligament, sartorius tendon, medial 
gastroc, and semimembranosus repair had to be postponed, which 
had an adverse effect on the rehabilitation of Mr. Avila. 
30. Due to the condition of the incisions on both legs, 
Mr. Avila underwent surgery on February 13, 1984, to remove 
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necrosis of peri-incisional skin and subcutaneous fat on the left 
thigh. 
31. As a direct and proximate result of the defendants' 
negligence in causing Mr. Avilafs loss of his popliteal artery 
and the subsequent graft, he is placed at a risk of loss of his 
right lower extremity. 
32. Prior to the accident, Mr. Avila was a member of the 
Bolivian Nation Ski Team and was in Park City, Utah, training for 
the 1988 Winter Olympic Games and other world-class ski races. 
33. Mr. Avila has been advised by Dr. Howe that he cannot 
ski again due to the risk of loss of his leg. 
34. Dr. Winn claims that he had a consultation over the 
phone with Dr. Howe wherein Dr. Howe directed Dr. Winn to attempt 
to get the knee joint back into place. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
35. Plaintiff alleges that Holy Cross Hospital was negli-
gent and deviated from the minimally acceptable standard of care 
in the following particulars: 
(a) Holy Cross Hospital Park City Ambulance Service. 
(i) Mr. Avila alleges that it was negligent 
misconduct on behalf of the EMT's, ambulance driver or technician 
to remove Mr. Avilafs boot and/or splint in the ambulance; 
(ii) Mr. Avila alleges that under circumstances 
where there is an acute dislocation of the knee, there is a risk 
of pinching the popliteal artery and, as a result, the leg should 
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be splinted and immobilized until it can be reset by a qualified 
orthopedic surgeon; and 
(iii) Mr. Avila further alleges that it is 
negligent misconduct on the part of Holy Cross Hospital to have a 
policy of transporting patients with acute orthopedic problems to 
the Holy Cross Clinic when there is not appropriate orthopedic 
staff on duty, 
(b) Holv Cross Hospital Family Health Center. 
(i) It was negligent misconduct on behalf of 
Holy Cross Clinic to solicit and treat Mr. Avila, who had an 
acute orthopedic problem, with a member of the staff who was a 
pediatrician and not trained to treat severe orthopedic 
conditions such as Mr. Avila's; and 
(ii) It was negligent misconduct on the part of 
the Clinic to solicit and treat orthopedic patients without 
having an orthopedic surgeon on call to perform that service; and 
(iii) It was negligent misconduct to have Holy 
Cross Ambulance transport orthopedic cases to the Center without 
having the requisite orthopedic staff. 
(c) Holy Cross Hospital. 
(i) It was negligent misconduct on the part of 
Holy Cross Hospital to fail to maintain a sterile environment in 
the operating room, which enabled the infection to occur in both 
incision sites; 
(ii) It was negligent misconduct on the behalf of 
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the staff of Holy Cross Hospital to fail to give to Mr. Avila the 
appropriate post operative wound care, which enabled the 
infection to take place; 
(iii) It was negligent misconduct by the staff of 
Holy Cross Hospital to fail to observe, diagnose, report and 
treat the infection in Mr. Avilafs extremities when they were 
discovered by the Hospital staff; 
(iv) It was negligent misconduct on behalf of the 
Hospital to maintain a clinic at a ski resort where they use 
their own ambulance service to pick up patients like Mr. Avila, 
with obvious orthopedic problems, and transport them to their own 
clinic to be treated by someone other than an orthopedic surgeon; 
(v) It was negligent misconduct on behalf of 
Holy Cross Hospital not to maintain an orthopedic surgeon at the 
Park City Clinic if they were going to attempt to deal with 
orthopedic problems; and 
(vi) It was negligent misconduct on behalf of 
Holy Cross Hospital not to train their staff members, such as 
Dr. Winn, to refer orthopedic problems either to an orthopedic 
surgeon in Park City or, alternatively, to transfer immediately 
orthopedic problems such as Mr. Avila1 s to a hospital which could 
perform orthopedic services. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
36. Plaintiff alleges that Robert Winn, M.D., was negligent 
and deviated from the minimally acceptable standard of care in 
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the following particulars: 
(a) It was negligent misconduct on the part of 
Dr. Winn to attempt to treat Mr. Avila, who had an obviously 
complicated orthopedic problem, when Dr. Winn was a pediatrician 
and not trained or experienced in dealing with injuries such as 
he was faced with with Mr. Avila; 
(b) It was negligent misconduct for Dr. Winn not to 
refer Mr. Avila immediately to an orthopedic surgeon or, alterna-
tively, immediately transport Mr. Avila to a health care facility 
which offered orthopedic services; 
(c) It was negligent misconduct on behalf of Dr. Winn 
to attempt to put Mr. Avilafs knee back into place at all and, 
specifically, it was misconduct to attempt to put the leg back 
into place by rotating the lower portion of that extremity; and 
(d) It was negligent misconduct on behalf of Dr. Winn 
to remove the splint placed on the leg. As a result of 
Dr. Winn's attempt to rotate the lower leg and to put the same 
into place, the popliteal artery was either severed or pinched. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
37. Plaintiff alleges that David J. Howe, M.D., was 
negligent and deviated from the minimally acceptable standard of 
care in the following particulars: 
(a) Dr. Winn alleges that he attempted to put the leg 
in place pursuant to the verbal directions given to him by 
Dr. Howe over the telephone. If this allegation is, in fact, 
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correct, it was negligent misconduct on the part of Dr. Howe to: 
(i) give verbal directions on the telephone as 
to how to get the leg in place without physically examining the 
same; 
(ii) put that treatment in the hands of a 
pediatrician who was not trained and did not have the experience 
to place an acutely dislocated knee back into place; and 
(iii) fail to direct Dr. Winn to refer Mr. Avila 
to an orthopedic specialist in the Park City area or, alterna-
tively, to have Mr. Avila immediately transported to a health 
care facility which offered orthopedic services. 
DAMAGES 
38. By way of damages, plaintiff complains and alleges 
that, as a direct and proximate result of defendants' negligence, 
plaintiff suffered injuries to his person as follows: 
(a) Loss of the popliteal artery, with the increased 
risk of loss of the limb due to the vein graft; 
(b) Neurological damage; i.e., numbness, in the right 
leg due to probable nerve damage which occurred during Dr. Winn's 
abortive attempt at relocating the knee; 
(c) The scarring which occurred on the left leg due to 
the vein grafting; 
(d) The scarring and loss of tissue occurring as a 
result of the second surgery to remove the necrotic skin as 
subcutaneous fat and other tissue; and 
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(e) The decrease in function of both extremities due 
to the vein graft and the nerve damage. 
39. In addition to the foregoing injuries, Mr. Avila was 
otherwise damaged due to the actions of the above-referenced 
health care providers in the following particulars: 
(a) Mr. Avila was a member of the Bolivian National 
Ski Team and was in training for the 1988 Winter Olympic Games, 
as well as other national and international meets, at the time of 
the accident. As a result of the vein graft, his skiing career 
is over. Had the popliteal artery not been pinched and the knee 
had been put into place appropriately, Mr. Avila would still have 
been able to ski competitively; 
(b) Risk of loss of lower extremity due to the vein 
bypass. Mr. Avila has a risk that should he injure his leg 
again, he could lose his leg; 
(c) The pain and suffering associated with undergoing 
the two unnecessary surgeries; i.e., the vein graft surgery which 
occurred on February 2, 1984, and the surgery to remove the 
necrotic tissue on February 14, 1984; 
(d) Due to the possibility of injuring the artery in 
his leg, and the decreased function of the leg and its accom-
panying effect on Mr. Avila1s lifestyle, Mr. Avila can no longer 
play active sports, such as soccer, tennis, etc.; 
(e) Pain and suffering associated with the infections 
and recovery from the unnecessary surgery; 
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(f) The costs of the extended stay in the hospital due 
to the infection; 
(g) Numbness in the legs and feet; and 
(h) Loss of the opportunity to ski in the 1988 Winter 
Olympic Games, Mr. Avila was assured a spot on the Bolivian 
National Team for the 1988 Olympics. By simply being a member of 
the Olympic Team, he would become a national hero. Mr. Avila had 
the talent and potential to become a world-class skier in the top 
levels of that competition. Due to his injuries, he was deprived 
of that opportunity, with the accompanying loss of the 
opportunity for lucrative endorsements, etc.; 
(i) Loss of prospective economic opportunity; and 
(j) Decreased earning capacity over his lifetime. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays judgment against the defendant 
for special and general damages in an amount as proven at the 
time of trial, together with plaintiff's costs in bringing this 
action and such other relief as the Court deems just and 
equitable. 
DATED this 23rd day of May, 1986. 
HALEY Sc STOLEBARGER 
GEORGE WT) H A L E ^ J 7 
%/ZOT Plaintiff Attorne 
P l a i n t i f f ' s Address: 
P.O. Box 4241 
Park City, Utah 84060 
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WILLIAM W. BARRETT (#A0229) 
<N, P.C. 
Defendant , David Howe, 
BUILDING ' ' 
KiPP ANO CHRISTIA
ATTORNEYS TOR 
6 0 0 COMMCMCIAU Ct.ua 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH S«lll 
(SOI) 321-3773 
M.D. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OP UTAH 
000O000 
ROLANDO AVILA, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
ROBERT T. WINN, M.D.; HOLY 
CROSS FAMILY HEALTH AND 
EMERGENCY CENTER; HOLY CROSS 
HOSPITAL PARK CITY AMBULANCE; 
HOLY CROSS HOSPITAL; DAVID 
HOWE, M.D., 
Defendants, 
-000O000-
ANSWER OF DEFENDANT, 
DAVID HOWE, M.D. 
Civil No. 8885 
The defendant, David Howe, M.D. (Dr. Howe), answers 
the Complaint of the plaintiff, Rolando Avila, and admits, 
denies and alleges as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
The plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim 
against Dr. Howe upon which relief can be granted. 
-1-
C /U U J. ^ T " 
SECOND DEFENSE 
1. Dr. Howe admits that the plaintiff is a resident 
of Summit County, State of Utah. 
2. Dr. Howe admits that he is a physician 
practicing medicine in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
3. Dr. Howe admits that the plaintiff has served 
him with a Notice of Intent to Commence Malpractice Action 
pursuant to Section 78-14-8, Utah Code Annotated; and further 
admits that the plaintiff filed a request with the Department 
of Business Regulation for a prelitigation screening panel. 
4. Dr. Howe admits that he had a telephone conver-
sation with defendant, Robert T. Winn, M.D., on the day plain-
tiff was injured. 
5. Dr. Howe denies that he was negligent or 
deviated from the minimally acceptable standard of care with 
respect to his telephone conversation with Dr. Winn or any 
verbal directions he may have given him. 
6. Dr. Howe denies that he was negligent in 
connection with the health care services which he provided 
to plaintiff or that he is otherwise liable to him. 
7. Dr. Howe denies each and every other allegation 
against him contained in plaintiff's Complaint. 
-2-
• P A N O C H R I S T I A N . RC. I 
ATTomnmrs AT LAW 
6 0 0 COMMCnCIAU 
CLUB BUILDING 
S A L T L A K E CITY, 
U T A H 8-AnI 
(eoi) sai>3773 
THIRD DEFENSE 
The injuries and damages which the plaintiff 
sustained were caused as a result of the negligence or other 
fault of parties other than Dr. Howe. 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
The injuries and damages which plaintiff sustained 
were caused as a result of a condition which was beyond the 
control of Dr. Howe. 
FIFTH DEFENSE 
The plaintiff's claim must be reduced by the amounts 
received by him from "collateral sources" in accordance with 
the provisions of Section 78-14-4.5, Utah Code Annotated. 
SIXTH DEFENSE 
Plaintiff has failed to mitigate his damages. 
WHEREFORE, defendant, David Howe, M.D. , prays that 
the Complaint of the plaintiff, Roland Avila, be dismissed 
with prejudice and that he be awarded his costs. 
DATED this /v day of June, 1986. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Attorney for Defendant, David 
Howe, M.D. 
-3-
NO CHRISTIAN. RC. j 
'OftNCYS AT LAV* 
(O COMMERCIAL 
I U I •UILOING 
ALT LAKC O T Y , 
U T A H 8<*iti 
aOl) S31-3773 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
>PANO CHRISTIAN. PC. 
ATTOWNCYS AT LAW 
eoo COMMCWOAL 
C L U « BU1LOINC 
SACT LAKC CITY, 
UTAH a^i 11 
(•Ol) Sa»-3773 
MAILED, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Answer of Defendant, David Howe, M.D. this 
^TM day of June, 1986, to the following: 
George M. Haley 
HALEY & STOLEBARGER 
Tenth Floor, Walker Center 
175 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and 
David R. Hamilton 
Michael G. Belnap 
FARR, KAUFMAN & HAMILTON 
205 - 26th Street, #34 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
\ 
(^Mvfofflw 
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DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS ..^GULATION 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, P.O. Box 45802 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 530-6730 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROLANDO AVILA, 
Petitioner, 
-vs-
ROBERT T. WINN, M.D., HOLY CROSS 
FAMILY HEALTH AND EMERGENCY CENTER, 
HOLY CROSS HOSPITAL PARK CITY AMBULANCE, 
HOLY CROSS HOSPITAL, and 
DAVID HOWE, M.D., 
Respondents 
Case No. PR-86-03-007 
NOTICE OF 
PRELITIGATION HEARING 
DATE OF HEARING: 
TIME: 
LOCATION: 
DECEMBER 2, 1986 
1:00 p.m. 
Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
(Room assignment to be announced) 
Dated this 3rd day of October 1986. 
A^"r~^I*{ 
David E. Robipson 
Director 
Given the informal nature of the Hearing, the provisions of Utah Code 
Annotated §78-14-15 as to the inadmissibility of evidence offered in any 
subsequent court action, and the large number of requests for prelitigation 
hearings filed with the Division, the following rules will apply: 
1. No request for a continuation of the Hearing will be considered 
unless received by the Division within 15 days from the date of this 
notice. 
2. No more than two hours will be allocated to conduct the Hearing. 
3. It is the responsibility of all respondents to notify their 
respective insurance carriers regarding the Hearing. 
4. If counsel is retained by the respondent(s), it is the duty of 
counsel to notify the Division. 
5. Subpoenas requested by a party must be presented to the Division 
Director in proper form for his issuance before being served by the 
P R O O F O F S E R V I C E 
I hereby certify that I have this day served the foregoing NOTICE OF 
PRELIT1GATION HEARING on ail parties of record in this proceeding by mailing a 
C0Py» properly addressed, with postage prepaid to: 
George M. Haley 
Attorney at Law 
HALEY & STOLKBARGER 
Tenth Floor Walker Center 
175 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1956 
David W. Slagle 
Attorney at Law 
SNOW, CHR1STENSEN 
10 Exchange Place, 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 
& MARTINEAU 
11th Floor 
84145 
William W. Barrett 
Attorney at Law 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
600 Commercial Club Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
David H. Epperson 
Attorney at Law 
HANSEN, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
176 South West Temple, Suite 650 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 3rd day of October, 1986 
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
Division of Occupational & 
Professional Licensing 
Gwen B. Rowley 
Notary Public 
Residing in Salt Lake County, 
Commission Expiring: 2-8-90 
lah 
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
Hebcr M, Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, P.O. Box 45802 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 530-6730 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROLANDO AVILA, 
-vs-
HOLY CROSS HOSPITAL 
Petitioner, 
Respondent 
Case No. PR-86-03-007 
PANEL OPINION 
Appearances: 
George M. Haley-
David W. Slagle 
For the Petitioner 
For the Respondent 
BY THE PANEL: 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 2nd day of 
December, 1986, before W. Kevin Jackson, Chairman, Robert H. Lamb, M.D., and 
B. J. Dobbins, prelitigation panel members all designated in that regard 
pursuant to Section 78-14-12, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, and the rules 
of procedure promulgated relative thereto. 
Evidence was offered and received. Said panel being fully advised in 
the premises, hereby enters it's Opinion in the matter. 
As to the Respondent, the panel finds the claim as set forth in the 
request for prelitigation review is: 
(1) 
(2) l ^ 
MERITORIOUS 
NON-MERITORIOUS 
(3) -Qst^1 g*- .did not result in harm to Petitioner (if applicable) 
Dated this 2nd day of December , 1986 
^w^c^y xL.i^^^K-
ot- c^i' 
/ • / • / ' 
P R O O F 0 F S E R V I C E 
I hereby certify that I have this day served the foregoing PANEL OPINIONS and 
AFFIDAVIT OF COMPLIANCE on all parties of record in this proceeding by mailing 
a copy, properly addressed, with postage prepaid to: 
George M. Haley 
Attorney at Law 
HALEY & STOLEBARGER 
Tenth Floor Walker Center 
175 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1956 
David W. Siagie 
Attorney at Law 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
William W. Barrett 
Attorney at Law 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
600 Commercial Club Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
David H. Epperson 
Attorney at Law 
HANSEN, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
176 South West Temple, Suite 650 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 8th day of December, 1986. 
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
Division of Occupational & 
Professional Licensing 
iA^ Gwen B^  Rowley 
Notary Public 
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah 
Commission Expiring: 2-8-90 
David H. Epperson, #1000 
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
Attorney for Defendant Dr. Winn 
175 South West Temple, #650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
IN THE THIRD JUDICAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROLANDO AVILA, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT T. WINN, M.D.; HOLY 
CROSS FAMILY HEALTH AND 
EMERGENCY CENTER; HOLY 
CROSS HOSPITAL PARK CITY 
AMBULANCE; HOLY CROSS 
HOSPITAL; DAVID HOWE, M.D., 
Defendants. 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Civil No: 8885 
COMES NOW the defendant, Robert T. Winn, M.D., and pursuant 
to §78-14-4, Utah Code Annotated (1979), and §78-14-12, Utah Code 
Annotated (1987), moves the Court for an Order of Dismissal. 
DATED this // day of November, 1987. 
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
DAVID H. EPPERSC 
Attorney for Defendant Dr. Winn 
MAILED POSTPAID a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
this \J- day of November, 1987/ to: 
David R. Hamilton, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
205 - 26th Street, #34 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
George M. Haley, Esq. 
Attorney for Plantiff 
Tenth Floor Walker Center 
175 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
David W. Slagle, Esq. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendants Holy Cross 
P. 0. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
William W. Barrett, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant Howe 
City Centre I, #330 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
DAVID W. SLAGLE 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Holy Cross Family Health 
and Emergency Center, Holy 
Cross Hospital Park City 
Ambulance, and Holy Cross 
Hospital 
Eleventh Floor, Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
P. O.Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROLANDO AVILA, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT T. WINN, M.D.; HOLY 
CROSS FAMILY HEALTH AND 
EMERGENCY CENTER; HOLY 
CROSS HOSPITAL PARK CITY 
AMBULANCE; HOLY CROSS 
HOSPITAL; DAVID HOWE, M.D., 
Defendants 
MOTION TO DISMISS AS TO 
HOLY CROSS FAMILY HEALTH 
AND EMERGENCY CENTER, 
HOLY CROSS HOSPITAL PARK 
CITY AMBULANCE, AND HOLY 
CROSS HOSPITAL 
No. 8885 
Defendants, Holy Cross Family Health and Emergency Center, 
Holy Cross Hospital Park City Ambulance, and Holy Cross 
Hospital, hereby move the Court for an Order of Dismissal 
pursuant to §78-14-4, UTAH CODE ANN. (1979), and §78-14-12, 
UTAH CODE ANN. (1987). 
DATED this T day of November, 1987. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
L ^ By 
" David W. Sic 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Holy Cross Family Health 
and Emergency Center, Holy 
Cross Hospital Park City 
Ambulance, and Holy Cross 
Hospital 
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE / SS' 
REBECCA BOOTEE, being duly swcrr., csyr th?t s:\-~ is 
employed in the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, 
attorneys for defendants Holy Cross herein; that 
she served the attached Motion to Dismiss as to defendants Holy Cross 
___ (Case No. 8885 ) upon the parties 
listed below by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an 
enveloce addressed to: 
David R. Hamilton, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
205 - 26th Street, #34 
Ogden, Utah84 4 01 
George M. Haley, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Tenth Floor, Walker Center 
175 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
David H. Epperson, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant Winn 
Suite 650, 
17 5 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
William W. Barrett, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant Howe 
City Centre I, #330 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, 
on the 4th day of November , 1987. 
REBECCA BOOTEE 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 4th day 
o f
 MovombQg ' 1987. 
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COUNTY OF SUMMIT - STATE OF UTAH 
T P L E : U PARTIES PRESENT) . 
• AVILA.ROLANDO f p%Q 5t) 
FILE NO. 83S5 
COUNSEL: K C O U N S E L PRESENT) 
••DAVID r.. I IAI I I ITO: ; 
ROBERT T. WINN, M.D., ET AL "Z DAVID H. SEBGRSON, DAVID W. SLAGLE, BBIZABI 
HOLY CROSS BREMEN 
DAVID HOWE, M.D. ROBERT H. BUffiETBILLIAM W BARRETT 
JOYE D. OVARD 
3AYLE CAMPBELL 
MARK ROBERTSON 
CLERK 
REPORTER 
BAILIFF 
)^L. 
HON. 
DATE: 
trOZCl&JZ. 
MICHAEL R. 
1.0-3-38 
C x o ^ x \lotC> Tt\i2-ci 
MURPflY 
JU CLA1 ' »r 
JUDGE 
v t>UL CLcX~s'*<*1£ti 
v.u -rr?T-T-A,,;T ran-. HOLY CPP^S O^S^ ITA!.,. * WINN'S MOTTOMFTO DISMISS ,?^L O^TVVJJZ'* £ /fi-./r/ 
f'%i/«rf" {A^cJAvJttA r.JfaJstCtLiJ Li> g g f )T£a>' G»u>ri<acX >^A^ 77 sj^,. ,; /r</' v-4^7 
J 
DAVID W. SLAGL E 
SHOW, CHRJSTENSEN & M&RTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100 
Pes- Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 3 4145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Holy Cross Family Health 
and Emergency Can-car, Holy 
Cross Hospicai Park Cicy 
Ambulance, and Holy Cross 
Hoscitai 
i:i THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE CF UTAH 
ROLANDO AVILA, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT T. WINN, M.D.; HOLY 
CROSS FAMILY HEALTH AND 
EMERGENCY CENTER; HOLY CROSS 
HOSPITAL PARK CITY AMBULANCE; ] 
EOLY CROSS HOSPITAL; DAVID ] 
EOWE, M.D., ] 
Defendants. 
i ORDER 
Civil No. 990? 
W w w «•» 
Defendant Holy Cross Hospital's Motion to Dismiss came on 
regularly for hearing and decision,, pursuant to Notice, before 
the above-entitled Court on March 7, 1988. George M. Haley 
appeared on behalf of the plaintiff and Elizabeth King Brennan 
appeared on behalf of defendant Holy Cross Hospital. 
The Court, being fully advised on the premises, having 
reviewed the pleadings and heard oral argument, hereby orders 
as follows: 
!• The legislative intent behind recuirinc craiiticati 
panel review before medical malpractice actions may be filed 
has not been accorded ios due; consequently, proceedings rel£ 
vano to this acoion are herebv toiled oendinc full creli~icao 
panel review. 
2. Subsequent to the decision rendered by the panel, 
DATED this day of March, 193 8 
BY THE COUR'] 
Par 3- Br i an , Distr-irct Judge 
- 2 -
DEPARTMENT OF BUSlNfcSS REGULATION 
Heber ft. Walls Building 
160 East 300 South, P.O. Box 45802 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone; f80i; 530-6628 
8EF0RL THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROLANDO AVILA 
—vs-
R08ERT T. WINN, M.O. 
Petitioner, 
, HOLY CROSS : 
FAMILY HEALTH AND EMERGENCY CENTER, : 
HOLY CROSS HOSPITAL 
HOLY CROSS HOSPITAL, 
PARK CITY AMBULANCE,: 
DAVID HOWE, M.D. : 
Respondents, : 
Case No. PR-36-03-007 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
COMPLIANCE 
I* Dav/id E. Robinson, Director, Division of Occupational £ Professional 
Licensing, Deoartment of Business Regulation, hereby certify that a]1 
requirements set forth in §78-14-12, Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended, have 
been satisfied regarding prelitigation review of the above-entitled matter. 
Dated this 12th day of July, 1988. 
Dav/xd E. RobinVon 
Director 
S T A T E S E A L 
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DAVID W. SLAGLE (A2975) 
ELIZABETH KING BRENNAN (A4863) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Holy Cross Family Health 
and Emergency Center, Holy 
Cross Hospital Park City 
Ambulance, and Holy Cross 
Hospital 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROLANDO AVILA, 
Plaintiff, MOTION TO DISMISS 
vs. 
ROBERT T. WINN, M.D.; HOLY 
CROSS FAMILY HEALTH AND 
EMERGENCY CENTER; HOLY CROSS 
HOSPITAL PARK CITY AMBULANCE; 
HOLY CROSS HOSPITAL; DAVID 
HOWE, M.D., 
Defendants. 
Under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 4Kb) and 
SS 78-14-4 and 78-14-12, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended), the 
defendant Holy Cross Hospital moves the Court for an Order 
dismissing the plaintiff's Complaint. The Motion is based on 
the following: 
sap / f 
Civil No. 8885 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
r* ... u.i- ^ \) h 
1. Despite timely notice to appear or appoint other 
counsel, plaintiff has failed to prosecute his claim; 
2. Plaintiff's Complaint filed May 23, 1986 is 
technically deficient for failing to comply with mandatory 
statutory prerequisites. 
This Motion is supported by the accompanying Statement of 
Points and Authorities. 
DATED this Ifcl" day of September, 1988. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By % ^ ^ 
Elizabeth King Brennan 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Holy Cross Hospital 
SCMEKB197 
-2-
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) ss. 
PEGGY HERRING, being duly sworn, deposes and says that she 
is employed in the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, 
attorneys for defendant Holy Cross Family Health and Emergency 
Center, Holy Cross Hospital Park City Ambulance and Holy Cross 
Hospital herein; that she served the attached MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
(Case No. 8885, Summit 
County) upon the parties listed below by placing a true and 
correct copy in an envelope addressed to: 
Rolando Avila 
Post Office Box 1761 
Park City, Utah 84060 
William W. Barrett 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
City Centre I, #330 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
David H. Epperson 
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
175 South West Temple, #650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, 
on this 16th day of September , 1988. 
PEGGY 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me on this 16th day of 
September - ' t 1988. 
My Commission Expires: 
l-M-90 NOTAR^ PUBLIC Residing in the State of Utah 
GEORGE M. HALEY (1302) 
STEVEN P. ROWE (4656) 
HALEY & STOLEBARGER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Tenth Floor, Walker Center 
175 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 801/531-1555 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH ( cpy 
ROLANDO AVILA, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
ROBERT T. WINN, M.D., et al., 
Defendants. 
WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL 
Civil No. 8885 
George M. Haley and Steven P. Rowe of the office of Haley & 
Stolebarger, pursuant to Rule 2.5 of the Rules of Practice of the 
District and Circuit Courts, hereby withdraw as counsel of record 
for the Plaintiff, Rolando Avila, in the above-entitled action. 
Such withdrawal will not result in a delay of trial and no trial 
date has been set. 
DATED this £tt day of August, 1988. 
HALEY & STOLEBARGER 
STEVEN P. ROWE 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 
correct copies of the foregoing 
mailed, postage prepaid, to the 
Daivd W. Slagle 
10 Exchange Place 
Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
David H. Epperson 
175 S. West Temple, #650 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
O? 7 day of August, 1988, true and 
"Withdrawal of Counsel" were 
following: 
William W. Barrett 
Kipp & Christian 
City Centre I, #330 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Rolando Avila 
Post Office Bex 1761 
Park City, UT 84060 
^Li.^ 
DAVID W. SLAGLE (A2975) 
ELIZABETH KING BRENNAN (A4863) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Holy Cross Family Health 
and Emergency Center, Holy 
Cross Hospital Park City 
Ambulance, and Holy Cross 
Hospital 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROLANDO AVILA, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT T. WINN, M.D.; HOLY 
CROSS FAMILY HEALTH AND 
EMERGENCY CENTER; HOLY CROSS 
HOSPITAL PARK CITY AMBULANCE; 
HOLY CROSS HOSPITAL; DAVID 
HOWE, M.D., 
Defendants. 
Defendant Holy Cross Hospital submits the following 
Statement in support of its Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 
2.8, Rules of Practice in the District Courts for the State of 
Utah. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
Civil No. 8885 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
.(^ ., , . L ^  flA ' 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
1. This claim involves an allegation of medical 
malpractice against the defendants for treatment rendered to 
Rolando Avila on or about February 1, 1984. 
2. A Notice of Intent to Commence Malpractice Litigation 
was filed on or about January 31, 1986 as required by § 78-14-8, 
Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended). 
3. On March 4, 1986, plaintiff filed a Request for Panel 
Review as required by § 78-14-12(2), Utah Code Ann. (1953, as 
amended). 
4. Pursuant to § 78-14-11(1) of the Utah Code Ann. (1953, 
as amended) a prelitigation screening panel hearing is required 
as a compulsory condition precedent before a plaintiff may file 
a Complaint. 
5. On or about June 30, 1986, the parties stipulated 
prelitigation review would be extended for successive 30-day 
periods until the Department of Business Regulations scheduled 
the hearing. This Stipulation, prepared by plaintiff's 
counsel, is attached hereto as Exhibit "A." 
6. Before such a hearing was scheduled, plaintiff filed a 
Complaint on or about May 23, 1986. 
7. Not until after the Complaint was filed was a preliti-
gation panel hearing held, on December 2, 1986. During this 
hearing, plaintiff did not bother to put on any evidence to 
support his allegations. 
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8. Defendant's first Motion to Dismiss was heard on 
March 7, 1988. After oral argument, the Court ruled the case 
should be sent back for full prelitigation panel review. The 
Court's Order is attached as Exhibit "B." 
9. A second prelitigation panel hearing was held on 
July 6, 1988. The Department of Business Regulations issued an 
Affidavit of Compliance on July 12, 1988; such Affidavit was 
accompanied with a 3-page "Opinion of the Panel." The Panel's 
findings as well as the Opinion are attached as Exhibit "C." 
10. On August 23, 1988, plaintiff's counsel of record 
withdrew. 
11. On August 25, 1988, plaintiff was given 30 days to 
appoint other counsel or to appear in person. No response was 
generated. 
ARGUMENT
 f 
POINT I Q 0 *<*/* ' 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR 
FAILURE TO PROSECUTE PURSUANT TO RULE 41(b), 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
It is undisputed that in order to handle the business of 
the court with efficiency and expedition, the trial court has a 
reasonable latitude of discretion in dismissing for failure to 
prosecute if a party fails to move forward according to the 
rules and directions of the court, without justifiable excuse. 
-3-
Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, 
Inc., 544 P.2d 876 (Utah, 1975). Whether there is such 
justifiable excuse is determined by several factors: (1) the 
length of time since the suit was filed; (2) the opportunity 
both parties have had to move the case forward; (3) degree of 
difficulty or prejudice caused to the other side; and (4) 
whether injustice may result from the dismissal. Id- at 879. 
In the interest of expediency and efficiency, several 
decisions from the Utah Supreme Court have held that dismissal 
for failure to prosecute is not an abuse of discretion. 
Grundman v. Williams & Peterson, 685 P.2d 538 (1984); Pitman v. 
Bonham, 677 P.2d 1126 (1984); K.L.C., Inc. v. Lambert, 613 P.2d 
765 (1980); Maxfield v. Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323 (1975); and 
Thompson Ditch Co. v. Jackson, 508 P.2d 528 (1973). 
In the present case, plaintiffs have failed to timely 
submit notice of appearance as required by Rule 2.5 of the 
Rules of Practice for the District Courts of the State of 
Utah. Consequently, pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, plaintiff's claims should be involuntarily 
dismissed for failure to prosecute. 
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IN THE ALTE^ATtVEV^IAfTSTTXPr'S COMPLAINT 
SHOULD BE DISMISSED FQEHF'MLING TO TIMELY 
OBTAIN A PRELITI&ATTdN HEARING WHICH IS A 
COMPULSORY CONDITION PRECEDENT TO FILING A 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE COMPLAINT. 
The statutory language of Utah's Health Care Malpractice 
Act establishes jurisdictional requirements that must be 
fulfilled before a court will recognize the claimant's action. 
The party initiating a medical malpractice action 
shall file a Request for Prelitigation Panel Review 
with the Department of Business Regulation within 60 
days after the filing of a Statutory Notice of Intent 
to Commence Action under Section 78-14-8. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(2) (1986) (emphasis added). 
Further, the Utah legislature has specifically stated the 
consequence of noncompliance with the Health Care Malpractice 
Act: The Complaint cannot be filed. 
The [prelitigation panel] proceedings are informal and 
non-binding, but are compulsory as a condition 
precedent to commencing litigation. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(1) (1985) (emphasis added). 
The language of the statute is unequivocal. The timing and 
sequence of events does matter; the prelitigation screening 
must occur before a Complaint can be filed. As the Utah 
Supreme Court noted: 
There are numerous instances in which the law requires 
fulfillment of a condition precedent before the filing 
of a complaint, a failure to comply with the condition 
may result in a dismissal. 
-5-
Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 150 (Utah 1979), citing 
Costello v. United States, 635 U.S. 265, 81 S.Ct. 532, 5 
L.Ed.2d 551 (1961). 
The Court in Foil then upheld the statutory requirement of 
filing a Notice of Intent and affirmed the dismissal of 
plaintiff's lawsuit for failure to comply with the statutory 
prerequisites. See also, Yates v. Vernal Family Health Center, 
617 P.2d 352 (Utah 1980); Vealey v. Clegg, 579 P.2d 919 (Utah 
1978). 
The statutory purpose and mandate is clear: A plaintiff 
cannot initiate a claim against a health care provider without 
first complying with the statutory requirement of a prelitiga-
tion panel hearing. Without such a prior hearing, plaintiff's 
case must be dismissed. A contrary ruling would be in opposi-
tion to the legislature's stated purpose, that of reducing the 
number of meritless medical malpractice actions by forcing 
early appraisal and review. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should defer to the case law and to the Utah 
legislature's judgment by refusing to recognize plaintiff's 
claim based on his failure to prosecute and his failure to 
timely undergo prelitigation panel review. 
-6-
DATED this |5™ day of September, 1988. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By ftit/Mfo* &ht'fr^v^ 
Elizabeth King^Brennan 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Holy Cross Hospital 
SCMEKB198 
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) ss. 
PEGGY HERRING, being duly sworn, deposes and says that she 
is employed in the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, 
attorneys for defendant Holy Cross Family Health and Emergency 
Center, Holy Cross Hospital Park City Ambulance and Holy Cross 
Hospital herein; that she served the attached STATEMENT OF 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT's MOTTOM TO 
DISMISS (Case No. 8885, Summit 
County) upon the parties listed below by placing a true and 
correct copy in an envelope addressed to: 
Rolando Avila 
Post Office Box 1761 
Park City, Utah 84060 
William W. Barrett 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
City Centre I, #330 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
David H. Epperson 
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH 
175 South West Temple, #650 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, 
on this 16th day of September , 1988 • 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me on this 16th day of 
September- , 1988. 
My Commission Expires: UL CVVL 
NOTARY) PUBLIC 
Residing in the State of Utah 
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1 that you were going to come in here today with a lawyer, 
2 or state unequivocally that you were going to have no 
lawyer, 
MR. AVILLA: It's such a complicated matter, 
how could I get a lawyer to review files this big and — 
THE COURT: I'll tell you that lawyers 
become quick studies on these things. 
MR. AVILLA: I'm sure, but — 
8 II THE COURT: Two weeks is more than adequate 
9 I) time. 
MR. AVILLA: The motion in dismissal is 
already been overruled, so I don't feel that I have any --
THE COURT: Do you want to have a hearing 
today, Ms. Brennen, on your pending motion to dismiss, 
or do you merely want me to schedule everything. 
MR. EPPERSON: May I address that briefly. 
Your Honor, a notice of intent to commence a malpractice 
16 I  action was filed in January of 1986. We are obviously 
17 (I now in October of 1988, and Mr. Avilla and his counsel 
— previous counsel, that is — had ample opportunity 
over several years to explore the facts in this case. 
This is an unusual case in that we had two 
prelitigation panel reviews. The initial one was held, 
that was concluded, and really in leniency to the plaintiff, 
Judge Brian felt that it might be helpful to have a second 
prelitigation hearing, which was done before a medical 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 panel. A three page written opinion was issued, and 
25 I know the results of that are not significant to this 
CLAIR JOHNSON 
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 
prelitigation panel/ you can agree to extend for thirty 
day periods the time for that to come up. 
And that's what was done by the exhibit in 
front of you. 
THE COURT: Then what you are saying is 
that what the stipulation does is that even though the 
stipulation was entered into after the initiation of 
the lawsuit, that the stipulation would have allowed 
them to technically file a new lawsuit without going 
outside the statute of limitations after the prelitigation 
hearing was scheduled. 
MS. BRENNEN: That's right. 
MR. EPPERSON: My understanding of the 
stipulation was that any defect that preexisted that 
stipulation was not waived. 
In other words, if a Complaint was filed before 
the prelitigation hearing request/ which is a condition 
precedent/ we were not waiving that as a defect. 
My understanding was that we felt it beneficial 
to have the prelitigation hearing/ and the intent of 
the additional stipulated time would be waived as far 
as that potential defect goes only. 
THE COURT: But the defect you're waiving 
in this motion could have been overcome by timely filing 
a new lawsuit. 
MR. EPPERSON: That's correct. 
THE COURT: After the December scheduled 
hearing? 
CLAIR JOHNSON 1 
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 
MR. EPPERSON: That's correct. The panel 
opinions have sixty days after issuance during which 
time the statute is tolled, and in which time a new --
within the sixty days a new Complaint should be filed 
if you are trying to rely upon the statute of limitations 
as having been tolled during the waiting period of the 
prelitigation hearing. 
THE COURT: A H right. The reason for 
my inquiry is this: Is that I don't think it's appropriate 
that someone's lawsuit should be dismissed and then they 
be required to file a new one, which obviously is going 
to be outside the statute of limitations, if the reason 
for the problem is caused by the delay in the Department 
of Business Regulations. 
It's just not fair, and I don't know how you 
get around the statute, but I guess you figure out a 
way. But I take it from what I hear is that that is 
not the case, there was a full right to file a new lawsuit 
-- technically a new lawsuit after the December hearing 
because of the stipulation that you have shown to me 
and which is part of my file. 
MS. BENNEN: That's accurate. 
MR. EPPERSON: Yes. I would say yes, 
that did not waive the defect in filing the original 
Complaint before meeting the conditions precedent. 
THE COURT: All right. 
Mr. Avilla, I think it's appropriate that the 
case should be dismissed. I have satisfied myself from 
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